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Abstract 
Security recently has become an important issue that needs to be addressed in an era 
where governments are investing heavily into preventive measures against cyber-
crime that includes denial of service attacks, tampering attacks, and eavesdropping 
attacks among others. These types of malpractice are foreseen as threats in future 5G 
scenarios, since confidential information will be downloaded, uploaded and processed 
via the upcoming 5G systems. Furthermore, the emergence of the 5G era requires the 
integration of multiple existing advanced technologies with innovative new 
techniques which will result in many security breaches. Thus, in this chapter, we 
present representative examples of potential threats and attacks against the main 
components of the future 5G systems in order to shed light on the future security 
issues and challenges in the upcoming 5G era. 
9.1 Introduction 
Nowadays, the trend towards ubiquitous computing environment, as envisioned by 
(Weiser, 1991), has led to mobile networks characterized by continuously increasing 
demand for high data rates and mobility. To address these issues, 5G mobile 
technology has emerged as the most prominent technology and a lot of effort has been 
placed on it during the past few years with the vision to be deployed by 2020 and 
beyond. 5G communications aim at providing big data bandwidth, infinite capability 
of networking and extensive signal coverage in order to support a rich range of high 
quality personalized services to the end-users. Towards this direction, 5G 
communications will integrate multiple existing advanced technologies with 
innovative new techniques. However, this integration can lead to tremendous security 
challenges in future 5G mobile networks (Bangerter, 2014).    
Particularly, it is expected that a wide spectrum of security issues will be  raised in 5G 
mobile networks due to a number of factors including: a) the IP-based open 
architecture of the 5G system, b) the diversity of the underlying access network 
technologies of the 5G system, c) the plethora of the interconnected communicating 
devices, which will also be highly mobile and dynamic, d) the heterogeneity of device 
types in terms of their computational, battery power and memory storage capabilities, 
e) the open operating systems of devices, and f) the fact that the interconnected 
devices are going to be usually operated by non-professional users in security issues. 
Consequently, 5G communications systems will have to address more much stronger 
threats than the current existing mobile communications systems. 
However, despite the fact that the upcoming 5G communication systems will be the 
target of many known and unknown security threats, it is not clear, which threats will 
be the most serious ones and which network elements will be targeted most 
frequently. Since such knowledge is of utmost importance towards the provision of 
guidance in ensuring security for the next generation mobile communication systems, 
the objective of this chapter is to present the potential security issues and challenges 
for the upcoming 5G communication systems.  
Following the introduction, this chapter is organized as follows. In section 9.2, we 
give an overview of a potential 5G communication system architecture based on the 
current related work on 5G communication systems; in section 9.3, representative 
examples of possible threats and attacks against the main components of the 
upcoming 5G systems are presented in order to shed light on the their potential 
security issues and challenges. Furthermore, mitigation techniques, derived from the 




In 5G communications, the adoption of a dense heterogeneous architecture, 
comprising macrocells and small cells, is one of the most promising low-cost 
solutions that will allow 5G networks to meet the industry’s capacity growth needs 
and to provide a uniform connectivity experience on the end-user’s side (Bangerter, 
2014). Based on the latest literature, we consider that a potential 5G communication 
architecture in a macrocell scale, as it is depicted in Fig.1, will include the Base 
Station (BS), equipped with large antenna arrays, as well as additional large antenna 
arrays of the BS geographically distributed over the macrocell network. The 
distributed large antenna arrays will play the role of small cell access points 
supporting multiple Radio Access Network (RAN) protocols for a wide range of 
underlying access network technologies (2G/3G/4G). Moreover, the mobile users in 
outdoor environment will collaborate with each other to form virtual large antenna 
arrays. The virtual large antenna arrays together with the distributed large antenna 
arrays (i.e. small cell access points) of the BS will construct virtual massive MIMO 
links in the small cells. The small cell access points rely on reliable backhaul 
connectivity over optical fibers (Wang, 2014; Bangerter, 2014). 
Furthermore, the buildings located in the 5G macrocell area will be also equipped 
with large antenna arrays installed outside of the building. Thus, every building will 
be able to communicate with the BS of the macro cell directly or with the distributed 
large antenna arrays of the BS. Besides, in every building, the outside installed large 
antenna arrays will be connected via cable to the wireless access points inside the 
building communicating with indoor users (Wang, 2014). 
Additionally, the Home eNode B (HeNB) reference architecture, defined by 3GPP in 
(3GPP TR 23.830 V9.0.0, 2009; 3GPP TR 33.820 V8.3.0, 2009; 3GPP TS 22.220 
V10.10.0, 2012), in order to construct femtocell, is very promising for the upcoming 
5G communication networks. It is because HeNB femtocell provides an effective 
solution to address the increasing demand for data rates. In particular, a HeNB 
femtocell is a low-power and low-range access point mainly used to provide indoor 
coverage for Closed Subscriber Groups (CSG). HeNB femtocells offload the 
macrocell network and provide broadband IP backhaul connection to the mobile 
operator's network through the subscriber’s residential Internet access. A number of 
HeNB femtocells may be grouped and addressed to a gateway, reducing the number 
of interfaces linked directly with the mobile operator's core network. This gateway is 
a mobile network operator’s equipment which is usually located physically on mobile 
operator premises (Wang, 2014; Bilogrevic, 2010; Gins, 2012). 
Moreover, the mobile femtocell (MFemtocell) concept described in (Wang, 2014) can 
be another promising technology for future 5G communications. This concept 
combines the mobile relay concept with femtocell technology to accommodate high 
mobility users, such as users in public transport trains, buses, and even private cars. 
MFemtocells will be small cells installed inside vehicles to communicate with users 
within the vehicles. Also, large antenna arrays will be installed outside the vehicles to 
enable communication with the BS of the macrocell directly or with the distributed 




The most attractive targets for future attackers in the upcoming 5G communication 
systems will be the User Equipment, the access networks, the mobile operator’s core 
network and the external IP networks. To help understand the future security issues 
and challenges affecting these 5G system components, we present representative 
examples of possible threats and attacks specific to these components. To derive these 
examples, we explore threats and attacks against legacy mobile systems (i.e., 
2G/3G/4G) that can affect the upcoming 5G communication systems by exploiting 
specific features in this new communication platform. For the presented attacks, we 
also discuss potential mitigation techniques derived from the literature, in order to 
provide a roadmap towards the deployment of more enhanced countermeasures.  
9.3.1 User Equipment 
In the 5G Communications era, User Equipment (UE), such as powerful smartphones 
and tablets, will be a very important part of our daily life. They will provide a wide 
range of appealing features to enable end-users to access a plethora of high quality 
personalized services. However, the expected growing popularity of the future UE 
combined with the increased data transmission capabilities of 5G networks, the wide 
adoption of open operating systems and the fact that the future UE will support a large 
variety of connectivity options (e.g., 2G/3G/4G, IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth) are factors 
that render the future UE a prime target for cyber-criminals. Apart from the traditional 
SMS/MMS-based Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, the future UE will be also exposed 
to more sophisticated attacks originated from mobile malware (e.g. worms, viruses, 
trojans) and target both the UE and the 5G cellular network. The open operating 
systems will allow end-users to install applications on their devices, not only from 
trusted, but also from untrusted sources (i.e., third-party markets). Consequently, 
mobile malware, which will be included in applications made to look like innocent 
software (e.g., games, utilities), will be downloaded and installed on end-user’s 
mobile device exposing them to many threats. Mobile malware can be designed to 
enable attackers to exploit the stored personal data on the device or to launch attacks 
(e.g. Denial of Service attacks) against other entities, such as other UE, the mobile 
access networks, the mobile operator’s core network and other external networks 
connected to the mobile core network. Hence, compromised future mobile devices 
will not only be a threat against their users, but also against the whole 5G mobile 
network serving them (La Polla, 2013). 
9.3.1.1 Mobile Malware Attacks Targeting UE 
As future UE in 5G era will be a personal device storing everything from phone 
contacts to banking information and taken almost everywhere by the end-user, it will 
serve as a single gateway to the end-user’s digital identity and activities. Thus, the UE 
will be increasingly vulnerable to mobile malware targeting the stored personal and 
sensitive information, such as bank credentials, SMSs/MMSs, audio/video files, 
emails, contacts and GPS coordinates, that attackers can exploit and misuse for 
financial gain. The malicious software will gain unauthorized access to the stored 
end-user’s information, collect it and forward it to the owner of the malware through 
all of the UE’s communication channels (Becher, 2011; Arabo, 2013; Flo, 2009).  
Additionally, the future UE will be vulnerable to mobile malware causing normal 
service operations disruption. To achieve disruption, the installed malicious software 
can use all available CPU cycles for junk computations leading to huge power 
consumption that will rapidly cause the depletion of the UE’s power source. This 
attack falls in the category of Denial of Service attacks against UE (Becher, 2011).  
However, the above attacks can be also executed by mobile botnets in order to target 
many mobile end-users at the same time and in an automated way. Thus, mobile 
botnets are expected to be a significant means for attackers to gain financial benefits 
on a larger scale in the 5G era. 
9.3.1.2 5G Mobile Botnets 
In 5G communication environment, mobile botnets are expected to be increasingly 
used by attackers, since future mobile devices will be ideal remote controlled 
machines due to their specific features. In particular, 5G mobile devices will support 
different connectivity options and increased uplink bandwidth, and will tend to be 
always turned on and connected to the Internet. Thus, future attackers will be enabled 
to deploy mobile botnets for 5G communication networks in many efficient ways 
(Arabo, 2013; Flo, 2009). 
Similar to mobile botnets in legacy mobile networks (La Polla, 2013), future mobile 
botnets for 5G networks will be networks of compromised mobile devices under the 
control of malicious actors commonly referred to as bot-masters. For example, a 
centralized 5G mobile botnet, where the compromised mobile devices will be 
controlled by the attacker through central Command & Control (C&C) servers, is 
illustrated in Figure 2. This centralized 5G mobile botnet will consist of the following 
actors (Arabo, 2013):  
• Bot-master: will be the malicious actor that can access and manage the 
botnet remotely via the bot-proxy servers (i.e., central C&C servers). The 
bot-master will be responsible to choose the mobile devices that will be 
compromised by malware and turned into bots. Specifically, the bot-master 
will exploit security vulnerabilities (e.g., operating system and 
configuration vulnerabilities) of the chosen mobile devices and compromise 
them. In current mobile botnets, the bot-masters can use similar http 
techniques, as the PC-based botnets use, as well as new techniques specific 
to mobile devices’ features, such as the SMS messages, in order to 
distribute their commands. Since 5G UE will support a large variety of 
connectivity options, it is also possible for the bot-masters of the future 5G 
mobile botnets to make use of additional techniques in order to command 
and control their bots.  
• Bot-proxy servers: will be the means of communication that the bot-master 
will use to command and control the bots indirectly.  
• Bots: will be programmed and instructed by the bot-master to perform a 
variety of malicious activities, such as Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks against network elements in the mobile network, mass 
distribution of spam, sensitive data theft and further distribution, as well as 




In 5G communications, access networks are expected to be highly heterogeneous and 
complex including multiple different radio access technologies (e.g., 2G, 3G, and 4G) 
and other advanced access schemes such as femtocells in order for service availability 
to be guaranteed. For instance, in the absence of 4G network coverage, the UE should 
be able to establish a connection over 2G or 3G networks. However, the fact that 5G 
mobile systems will support many different access networks leads them to inherit all 
the security issues of the underlying access networks that they will support (Piqueras 
Jover, 2013).  
During the evolution from 4G communications to 5G communications, enhanced 
security mechanisms should be implemented to counter emerging security threats on 
5G access networks. To address this issue, potential security threats and attacks for 
the future 5G access networks should be firstly identified. Thus, in this section, we 
focus on existing attacks on current 4G access networks and HeNB femtocells, which 
are also deemed possible attacks to the 5G access networks. 
9.3.2.1 Attacks on 4G Access Network 
In this subsection, we present representative attacks against the 4G access network 
that can be also expanded to 5G access network. Besides, mitigation solutions 
addressing these attacks are discussed.   
• UE Location Tracking 
Tracking the UE presence in a specific cell or over multiple cells is a security 
issue for LTE networks that can affect seriously subscriber’s privacy. Two 
techniques that can be used by attackers to achieve UE location tracking in 
future 5G access networks are those techniques for LTE networks described in 
(Seddigh, 2010) and (Forsberg, 2007). They are based on the Cell Radio 
Network Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI) and the packet sequence numbers.   
‐ UE Location Tracking based on C‐RNTI 
The C-RNTI provides a unique and temporary UE identification 
(UEID) at the cell level. It is assigned by the network via a RRC 
control signal when a UE is associated with the cell. However, the C-
RNTI is transmitted in the L1 control signal in plain text. Thus, an 
adversary is able to determine whether the UE using the given C-RNTI 
is still in the same cell or not. According to (Forsberg, 2007), periodic 
C-RNTI re-allocation is a potential solution. Periodic C-RNTI re-
allocation for a UE staying for a long time on the same cell can make it 
more difficult for an attacker to obtain information related to its 
presence on the cell. Additionally, it will make it more difficult for the 
attacker to distinguish if indeed a new UE has arrived to the cell or if it 
is the same UE that refresh its C-RNTI.  
Moreover, UE location tracking can be achieved by tracking the 
combination of the C-RNTI with handover signals. This combination 
allows UE location tracking across multiple cells. During the handover 
process, a new C-RNTI is assigned to the UE via the Handover 
Command message. Thus, in case that the allocation of C-RNTI itself 
is not confidentiality protected, an attacker can link the new C-RNTI in 
the Handover Command message and the old C-RNTI in the L1 
control signal (Seddigh, 2010), (Forsberg, 2007). To mitigate this type 
of attack, encryption of RRC messages, such as the Handover 
Command message and the Handover Confirm message, is proposed in 
(Forsberg, 2007). Encryption of these messages prevents an attacker 
from associating the RRC messages to a C-RNTI and mapping them 
together during handover processes.  
‐ UE Location Tracking based on Packet Sequence Numbers 
The use of continuous packet sequence numbers for the user plane or 
control plane packets before and after a handover can enable an 
attacker to determine the mapping between the old and the new C-
RNTIs (Seddigh, 2010). UE tracking based on packet sequence 
numbers can also be applicable to the idle-to-active mode transitions if 
the sequence numbers are kept continuous. Then, an attacker can track 
the UE based on the continuous packet sequence numbers of packet 
streams. To address UE tracking based on sequence numbers, the 
authors in (Forsberg, 2007) propose that the sequence numbers over the 
radio should be discontinuous in handover processes and possibly also 
in the state transitions between idle and active modes. Particularly, they 
propose the use of a random offset in order to make the user and 
control plane sequence numbers discontinuous on the radio link. 
Finally, another solution proposed also in (Forsberg, 2007) is the use of 
fresh keys for each eNB, which allows setting the sequence number to 
any random value and thus makes it discontinuous.        
• Attacks based on False Buffer Status Reports 
In LTE networks, an attacker can exploit the buffer status reports, which are 
used as input information for packet scheduling, load balancing and admission 
control algorithms, to achieve his malicious intents. Particularly, the attacker 
can send false buffer status reports on behalf of the legitimate UE in order to 
change the behavior of these algorithms on the eNBs and cause serving issues 
towards the legitimate UE (Forsberg, 2007; Seddigh, 2010). 
By changing the behavior of the packet scheduling algorithm, the attacker is 
able to steal bandwidth. To achieve that, the attacker can make use of C-
RNTIs of other legitimate UE and send false buffer status reports. This can 
make the eNB consider that the legitimate UE do not have data to transmit. 
Consequently, the packet scheduling algorithm in the eNB will allocate more 
resources for the attacker’s UE and no or less resources for the legitimate UE. 
This can lead to denial of service for the legitimate UE.         
Furthermore, by changing the behavior of load balancing and admission 
control algorithms in the eNBs, denial of service can be experienced by the 
new arriving UE in the cell. To achieve that, the attacker can send a wide 
range of false buffer status reports from various UE claiming that they have 
more data to send than what they actually have. This makes the eNB consider 
that there is a heavy load in this cell and new arriving UE cannot be accepted.  
To address the attacks based on false buffer status reports, the use of one-time 
access token within the MAC level buffer status report message is proposed in 
(Forsberg, 2007). According to this solution, the UE will have to present this 
token to the eNB to get the access right. The token is different for each buffer 
status report sent during a Discontinuous Reception (DRX) period.    
• Message Insertion Attack 
Message insertion attack is another type of attack for LTE networks and is 
described in (Forsberg, 2007) and (Seddigh, 2010). In LTE networks, the UE 
is allowed to stay in active mode, but turn off its radio transceiver to save 
power consumption. This is achieved through the DRX period. However, 
during a long DRX period, the UE is still allowed to transmit packets because 
the UE may have urgent traffic to send. This feature can be a potential security 
breach. An attacker can inject control protocol data units (C-PDU) to the 
system during the DRX period to achieve denial of service attack against the 
new arriving UE. According to (Forsberg, 2007), a solution for mitigating the 
message insertion attack is the request for capacity through the uplink buffer 
status report.    
9.3.2.2 HeNB Femtocell Attacks 
The physical size, material quality, lower cost components and the IP interface of the 
HeNB femtocells make them more vulnerable to attacks compared to eNBs 
(Bilogrevic, 2010). In this subsection, we present the main categories of the potential 
attacks related to HeNB femtocell, according to (3GPP TR 33.820, 2009), with 
specific examples of attacks for each category. Additionally, countermeasures for 
these attacks are discussed. An extensive and detailed list of all possible attacks 
related to HeNB femtocell and corresponding mitigations can be found in (3GPP TR 
33.820, 2009).    
• Physical Attacks on HeNB 
Physical tampering with HeNB is an attack where a malicious actor can 
modify or replace HeNB components. This attack is possible to affect both 
end-users and mobile operators. For example, modified RF components of a 
HeNB may interfere with other wireless devices of an eHealth tele-monitoring 
system in the patient’s environment and cause them to malfunction. This can 
result in health risks for the patient. On the operator’s side, a HeNB with 
modified RF components can impact harmfully on the surrounding macro 
network. Thus, it is obvious that HeNB should be physically secured in order 
to prevent easy replacement of its components. In addition, trusted computing 
techniques should be used to detect when modifications on critical 
components of a HeNB are occurred. Furthermore, booting HeNBs with 
maliciously modified software can lead to further security breaches for end-
users and operators. This can be achieved in HeNBs supporting user-
accessible boot code update methods. As a result, eavesdropping on 
communication and impersonation towards the network are two possible 
security issues that end-users have to address. Also, DoS attacks are possible 
to be launched against the network operators. A mitigation approach is to 
secure booting process by using cryptographic means, such as a Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM).    
• Attacks on HeNB Credentials 
In this category of attacks, the compromise of HeNB authentication 
credentials is included. According to this attack, an attacker obtains a copy of 
the authentication credentials from the wires of the targeted HeNB. Then, any 
malicious device can use them and impersonate the given HeNB. Thus, the 
attacker can mount masquerade attacks against the end-user and the operator. 
The success of obtaining a copy of the credentials of the targeted HeNB is 
based on the implementation. Consequently, the credentials should be stored 
in a protected domain, such as a TPM module, in order for them not to be 
compromised easily.   
• Configuration Attacks on HeNB 
A possible attack of this category is the mis-configuration of the Access 
Control List (ACL) of the targeted HeNB. Firstly, the attacker gains access to 
the ACL including the Closed Subscriber Group (CSG) list. Then, he modifies 
the ACL in order for devices that are not legitimate to access the network. In 
addition, the attacker can modify the ACL to prevent legitimate devices from 
accessing the network, as well as to change the level of access for different 
devices. As a result, legitimate end-users can experience the effects of DoS 
attacks, and some other malicious end-users can make use of services free of 
charge if the billing is based on the HeNB. Hence, it is essential to ensure 
secure creation, maintenance and storage of the ACL.      
• Protocol Attacks on HeNB 
Protocol attacks category includes man-in-the-middle attacks on HeNB first 
network access, which can cause very harmful impact on end-users. HeNBs 
are vulnerable to this type of attacks when they do not have unique 
authentication credentials. In these cases, during the first contact of the 
targeted HeNB to the core network over the Internet, the operator is not able to 
identify it. Thus, an attacker on the Internet can intercept all traffic originating 
from the HeNB and get access to private information and exploit it further.  
To address the man-in-the-middle attacks, authentication credentials should be 
used by the HeNB in the very first contact with the network. The use of UICC 
or certificates can be potential solutions towards mitigating these attacks. In 
UICC-based solutions, UICC is inserted in the HeNB by the point of sales or 
the customer, and mutual authentication between the HSS and the UICC takes 
place. On the other hand, in certificate-based solutions, the certificate is stored 
on the HeNB at the manufacturing phase of the HeNB and used for mutual 
authentication between the first contact node (i.e., Security GW) and the 
HeNB. 
• Attacks on Mobile Operator’s Core Network 
Denial of service (DoS) attacks can be launched, through malicious traffic 
originating from compromised HeNBs, against core network elements. Two 
categories of DoS attacks which can be directed to the core network, but not to 
the HeNBs are the following: a) IKEv2 attacks (e.g., IKE_SA_INIT flood 
attacks, IKE_AUTH attacks) that can be launched against the initial 
establishment of the IKEv2 tunnel between the HeNB and the Security 
Gateway, and b) layer 5-7 volume attacks and IKEv2 volume attacks when a 
high volume of signaling traffic or IKEv2 tunnel setup traffic overwhelms the 
infrastructure.  To mitigate these attacks, Security Gateway should remain 
secure and available as first contact point in the core network. Furthermore 
this category encompasses HeNB location-based attacks such as the changing 
of the HeNB location without reporting. A malicious actor may relocate the 
HeNB and make the provisioned location information invalid. As a result, this 
can cause emergency calls emanating from the relocated HeNBs not to be 
reliably located or routed to the correct emergency centers. Besides, lawful 
interception position reporting is impossible. Location locking mechanism is a 
potential solution to prevent these attacks.  
• User Data and Identity Privacy Attacks 
Eavesdropping of the other end-user’s E-UTRAN user data is a very harmful 
attack of this category against the privacy of the end-users. The attacker 
installs his own HeNB and configures it to the open access mode. Then, the 
targeted end-user makes use of this malicious HeNB in order to connect to the 
core network without knowing that this HeNB is compromised. Hence, the 
attacker is able to eavesdrop all data flowing between the targeted end-user 
and the network. This attack exploits the unprotected user traffic in some part 
of the HeNB. For that reason, unprotected user data should never leave a 
secure domain inside the HeNB to avoid this eavesdropping attack. 
Furthermore, the end-users should be notified when they are connected to a 
closed or an open type HeNB.    
• Attacks on Radio Resources and Management  
Radio resource management tampering is an attack where the HeNB provides 
incorrect radio resource information. To achieve this, the malicious actor has 
to get access to the HeNB and modify the resource management aspects of the 
HeNB. At least, he should be able to modify the power control part of the 
HeNB. An example of the consequences with this type of attack can be the 




Due to their IP-based open architecture, 5G mobile systems will be vulnerable to IP 
attacks that are common over the Internet. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which are 
a major threat on the Internet today, are going to be present on the future 5G 
communication systems targeting entities on the mobile operator’s core network. 
However, the 5G mobile operator’s core network can be also affected by Distributed 
DoS (DDoS) attacks targeting external entities, but transferring their malicious traffic 
over it. Potential attacks include:   
• DDoS Attacks Targeting the Mobile Operator’s Core Network 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks will be very serious incidents 
impacting the availability of the targeted future 5G mobile core network. Since 
5G mobile networks are going to be used by millions of users, the consequences 
of DoS and DDoS attacks against the core network will be severe. In 5G 
Communication environment, DDoS attacks can be launched by a botnet 
including a large number of infected mobile devices. In this subsection, two 
representative DDoS attacks against the 4G mobile operator’s core network are 
presented. These two examples of attacks can be also expanded to the 5G core 
network.  
‐ Signaling Amplification 
A DDoS attack example for future 5G mobile operator’s core network can 
be the signaling amplification attack that 4G networks face and is 
described in (Bassil, 2012). This attack can be performed by a botnet of 
multiple infected mobile devices within the same cell in order to deplete 
the network resources leading to service degradation. This attack exploits 
the signaling overhead required to set up and release dedicated radio 
bearers in LTE networks. Thus, a large number of dedicated bearer 
requests will be initiated simultaneously forcing the different network 
entities to follow the heavy signaling dedicated bearer activation procedure 
for each bearer. After obtaining the dedicated bearers, the bots will not use 
them, and after the expiration of the inactive bearer timeout, the bearers 
will be deactivated following the dedicated bearer deactivation procedure 
which incurs heavy signaling as well. Then, the malicious devices of the 
botnet will execute the same steps over and over again to amplify the 
attack and degrade the network performance. Finally, the proposed 
detection technique for this attack is based on features such as the inter-
setup time and the number of bearer activations/deactivations per minute. 
The setting of a lower bound threshold for inter-setup time determines the 
performance of the detection technique. A high value for the inter-setup 
time threshold would result in too many false positives. On the other hand, 
a low value for this threshold might lead to undetected exploits. 
Furthermore, a high number of bearer activations/deactivations per minute 
indicates malicious activity and should be discovered and stopped by the 
operator (Bassil, 2012), (Piqueras Jover, 2013).   
 
‐ HSS saturation    
A potential DDoS attack against the availability of the future 5G mobile 
operator’s core network can be an attack leading to Home Subscriber 
Server (HSS) saturation, as it is described in (Piqueras Jover, 2013), for 
4G networks.  
The HSS is an essential node of the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) since it 
comprises the master database for a given user and it contains the 
subscription-related information to support the network entities handling 
calls/sessions. The HSS also provides support functions in user 
authentication and access authorization. A Home Network may contain 
one or more HSSs based on the number of mobile subscribers, on the 
capacity of equipment and the organization of the network (EPC, 2014; 
3GPP TS 23.002 V12.4.0, 2014). Thus, a DDoS attack against this key 
node can potentially reduce the availability of the mobile core network 
significantly.  
In (Traynor 2009), some research work has already explored the 
possibility of overloading a Home Location Register (HLR), which is a 
key component of the HSS, exploiting a botnet of mobile devices. The 
results of this research showed that the reduction of the throughput is 
dependent on the size of the botnet. Moreover, it is worthwhile to mention 
that in this type of attacks, the legitimate users of the infected mobile 
devices are unlikely to be aware of their occurrence, since these attacks are 
executed by quietly launching network service requests and not a flood of 
phone calls. Finally, according to this research work, basic filtering and 
shedding are two possible mitigation techniques against such attacks. 
However, the implementation of mechanisms intelligent enough to 
respond to more dynamic attacks remains a challenging task. Particularly, 
it is difficult for a provider to distinguish attacks from other traffic, since a 
significant amount of context is lost as messages are exchanged between 
the mobile devices and the HLR (e.g., granularity of location). 
Furthermore, filtering in the core network may occur too late to prevent 
legitimate users from experiencing denial of service, due to the large 
overhead related to the first hop of communications in mobile networks 
(Traynor 2009).  
• DDoS  Attacks  Targeting  External  Entities  over  the  Mobile  Operator’s  Core 
Network 
In future, the upcoming 5G mobile networks can also serve as gateway for DDoS 
attacks against targets in other external networks (e.g. enterprise networks) 
connected to the mobile core network. In this scenario, a botnet of mobile devices 
can be used to generate high volume of traffic and transmit it to the victim, located 
in the external network’s infrastructure over the mobile core network. Although 
the target of these attacks will not be the core network itself, the fact that they 
inject large traffic loads into the core network can impact its performance. The 
recent DDoS attacks against Spamhaus over the Internet proved how the high 
volume of attack traffic can affect the availability of the underlying 




In 5G communication systems, external IP networks can also be the target of DDoS 
attacks, where mobile botnets generate high volume of traffic and transmit it to the 
target over the mobile core network. In addition, external IP networks, such as 
enterprise networks, can be a soft target for being compromised by malware through 
infected mobile devices accessing them. In this subsection, we present a 
representative scenario, based on (Li, 2013), of how an enterprise network can be 
compromised through the infected 5G mobile device of an employee. Furthermore, a 
solution against this threat, proposed in (Li, 2013), is also discussed.  
• Compromised Enterprise Networks 
The current wide adoption of smartphones has already led many employees to 
bring their own smartphone devices to the work environment and use them to 
access information assets located in isolated enterprise networks or enterprise 
networks with strict access control. This trend is expected to continue and 
accelerate in the upcoming 5G era. However, many security concerns will be 
raised for the enterprise networks accessed by employees’ smartphones due to the 
potential susceptibilities of smartphones to mobile malware (Li, 2013). The 
potential vulnerabilities can be exploited by attackers to compromise an otherwise 
secure enterprise network. For example, mobile malware, such as Dream Droid 
(Li, 2013) that recently infected the Android Market, can be used by attackers to 
get unauthorized access to enterprise networks through employees’ future 
smartphones.    
Furthermore, another characteristic of future employees’ smartphones that can be 
exploited by attackers to compromise enterprise networks will be the diversity of 
their connectivity capabilities. They will support not only mobile communication 
technologies (2G/3G/4G/5G), but also other connectivity technologies such as Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth, NFC and USB. Thus, the multiple connectivity technologies can be 
abused by attackers as mobile malware propagation channels. In other words, 
employees’ smartphones can work as bridges for attackers between the enterprise 
network and the outside world. Thus, an employee’s smartphone can be 
compromised through a mobile communication channel or a short-range 
communication channel and become a wormhole to the target enterprise network 
or bring the malicious payload directly to it through another communication 
channel supported by the smartphone.     
In an attack scenario, we consider that the employee’s smartphone is connected to 
a desktop PC through USB and the desktop PC is connected to the internal 
enterprise network. Then, the bot-master can be connected to a backdoor on the 
employee’s smartphone via Wi-Fi or the 4G mobile network and inject the 
malicious payload to the internal enterprise network through the USB connection.   
To avoid security breaches for the enterprise network arising from the use of 
employees’ smartphones inside the work environment, a very common approach 
is to periodically scan all employees’ smartphones with anti-malware software. 
However, this approach is intrusive and too costly energy-wise. Thus, innovative 
solutions providing a balance between security responsiveness and cost 
effectiveness are required. In (Li, 2013), strategic sampling is proposed as a 
method to address this requirement by identifying and periodically sampling the 
security representative smartphones. Then, the sampled devices are checked for 
malware infections. Smartphones’ security representativeness is measured by the 
employees’ interests and the co-location logs on their devices. The probabilities 
used in the strategic sampling method are derived from a lottery tree reflecting the 
smartphones’ security representativeness (Li, 2013). 
9.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have presented representative examples of potential threats and 
attacks against the main components of the upcoming 5G communication systems in 
order to elucidate the future security issues and challenges in the upcoming 5G era. 
Particularly, we have focused on examples of potential threats and attacks for the 
following 5G system components: the UE, the access networks, the mobile operator’s 
core network and the external IP networks. To derive the presented examples, we are 
based on threats and attacks against current existing mobile communication systems 
that can be expanded to the next generation 5G communication systems by exploiting 
their specific features. Finally, we have discussed potential mitigations, derived from 
the literature, for the presented attacks, since our vision is to provide a roadmap 
towards the deployment of more enhanced countermeasures addressing properly the 
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